By DR. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO
Manila Bulletin, Thursday, September 22, 2010
Service to constituency is normally the last perspective, which all other perspectives serve. This is true of the Navy Sail Plan, which prefers to label this last perspective as “accomplishment.”
Two priorities are listed under the accomplishment perspective. The first is a “secured maritime environment.” For the Navy, the proposed initiative to pursue this first priority is to set up an efficient data collection and reporting system on naval operations. Such system should be able to highlight progress using the business confidence index (maritime). This index is now at 20 percent (in 2010) and is targeted to rise to 25 percent (2011), 40 percent (2012 and 2013), and finally to 54 percent (2020). The other index such a system would highlight is the naval operations index. This one starts at an even lower base, and is targeted to rise to 6 percent (2011), 12 percent (2012), 18 percent (2013), and finally 85 percent (2020). This is a dramatic jump, an indication of the quantum leap the PN intends to execute through its Sail Plan.
Such a dramatic jump gives an indication of the distance the Navy intends to cover through its Sail Plan. A lay observer has no idea what goes into a naval operations index. But from the targets set for 2011-2013, one gets the idea that the index is currently at a very low level, and that it will take enormous effort, involving considerable commitment and resources, to lift such an index up, let alone to reach a high of 85 percent by 2020. By this, one appreciates the value of a measure that needs to be specified in any performance scorecard: It marks out where an institution is, indicating where one is currently; and it marks out a future milestone that needs to be reached, particularly at the end of the Vision period. On this measure alone, the naval operations index, the performance scorecard is calling for a genuine breakthrough result for the Navy to deliver in the next 10 years.
The second priority under the accomplishment perspective is “highly satisfied stakeholders.” The initiative the Navy proposes to undertake to secure this priority is to implement a dynamic strategic communications plan. The plan should result in an average satisfaction rating on the part of internal stakeholders (i.e. Navy personnel): On a scale of 1 to 10, the rating is targeted to be at 6 during the period 2011-2013. It should then gradually rise until it reaches nine in 2020. There are external stakeholders too: Their satisfaction rating also has to be tracked. At present, the Navy does not have such a satisfaction rating involving its external stakeholders: This has to be developed and subsequently surveys have to be undertaken regularly. These surveys need to be given due importance, especially in light of the Vision in the Navy Sail Plan: That Vision calls for a strong and credible Navy that our maritime nation can be proud of. The Filipino people must come around to regard their Navy highly, and because of the Navy’s accomplishments they should end up becoming proud of their Navy.
The strategic communications plan initiative is a recognition on the part of the PN that it is impossible for it to achieve the targets set out in the Sail Plan without the support and active involvement of other sectors of Philippine society. The general public has got to know what the Navy is supposed to do, and what resources the Navy should be able to count upon in order to carry out its Mission and realize its 2020 Vision. Indeed, the Navy’s rapport with the citizenry has to be deepened and constantly nurtured: The Navy has to keep investing in a well-thought-out and smartly-executed outreach program pitched to all Filipinos. It is the Navy’s good fortune that the people it serves are open; it should not be difficult, therefore, to win over their hearts and minds: In fact, they are craving for an institution they can genuinely be proud of, and the Navy is a deserving candidate for the people’s trust and affection, especially if it sails far and wide with the use of its Sail Plan.
Friday, September 24, 2010
PN Scorecard on Capability
By DR. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO
Manila Bulletin, Tuesday, September 20, 2010
Using the performance governance system (PGS), which calls for a balance of perspectives, one would ordinarily gloss over the issue about which of those perspectives are more important than the others. After all, under the PGS, what is important is that all key perspectives need to be duly taken into account.
In the case of the Philippine Navy (PN), however, one gets the distinct impression that the perspectives of personnel, organization, and resources have to be taken into account because of their bearing on capability. This is the perspective that matters deeply: After all, what the Navy can accomplish would depend critically upon its capability.
The PN has listed four priorities under the capability perspective. The first of these is “responsive naval support.” This has elicited the proposed initiative of pursuing a modernized PN logistics system. The timely arrival of resources is the proposed measure of success for this initiative. The targets for 2011, 2012, and 2013 are 80 percent, 85 percent, and 90 percent, respectively. For 2020, the target is 99 percent. The proposed measure shows how dependent this initiative is upon the availability of resources and upon when those resources are made available to the Navy. Delay can be damaging.
The second priority is “reliable naval facilities.” The Navy proposes two initiatives to pursue this priority. A high customer satisfaction on the use of naval facilities, as the first initiative, would have as its measure of success the increase in the average “customer satisfaction rating,” presumably on the part of PN personnel. The targets are: 75 percent for 2011, 80 percent for 2012, 85 percent for 2013, and finally 95 percent for 2020. The second initiative calls for a comprehensive PN real estate utilization program. The measure of success of this initiative is the average MDP completion rate of PN bases and stations. Starting from a low base in 2010, the Navy has set the following targets: 50 percent for 2011, 60 percent for 2012, 70 percent for 2013, and 100 percent for 2020.
Under the third priority of securing “up-to-date naval capability,” two initiatives have been put forward. The first is to establish a responsive self-reliance defense posture program, with the measure of success being the rating of equipment of OPREVAL. The targets start at 75 percent for 2011, 80 percent for 2012, and 85 percent for 2013. They end at 100 percent for 2020. The second initiative is full utilization of PN Defense Capability Assessment and Planning System. The measure of success is the percentage of capability proposal complied with (i.e. actual versus programmed), and this is targeted at 25 percent in 2011 (from the base of 20 percent in 2010). The target moves up to 40 percent in 2012, 60 percent in 2013, and finally 90 percent in 2020.
The fourth and final priority under the capability perspective is “optimal level of operational readiness.” Only one initiative is proposed, and it is to improve operational readiness program management. The critical measure of success of this initiative is the OPREVAL rating with the following targets: 60 percent in 2011, 65 percent in 2012, 70 percent in 2013, and 85 percent in 2020. The Navy is starting at a low base with respect to this measure, and the targets it has set for this measure indicate how difficult it is for the PN to push it up; even by 2020, it can put forward a target of only 85 percent.
One quick look at the performance scorecards the Navy has proposed under the capability perspective would impress upon anyone how critically important the indicated initiatives, measures, and targets are for success of the Navy Sail Plan. It is true that all performance scorecards have to be given due attention along with the necessary commitment, dogged perseverance, and resources. But it is the attention to the performance scorecards under the capability perspective which would ultimately determine whether the PN has succeeded with its Navy Sail Plan.
Manila Bulletin, Tuesday, September 20, 2010
Using the performance governance system (PGS), which calls for a balance of perspectives, one would ordinarily gloss over the issue about which of those perspectives are more important than the others. After all, under the PGS, what is important is that all key perspectives need to be duly taken into account.
In the case of the Philippine Navy (PN), however, one gets the distinct impression that the perspectives of personnel, organization, and resources have to be taken into account because of their bearing on capability. This is the perspective that matters deeply: After all, what the Navy can accomplish would depend critically upon its capability.
The PN has listed four priorities under the capability perspective. The first of these is “responsive naval support.” This has elicited the proposed initiative of pursuing a modernized PN logistics system. The timely arrival of resources is the proposed measure of success for this initiative. The targets for 2011, 2012, and 2013 are 80 percent, 85 percent, and 90 percent, respectively. For 2020, the target is 99 percent. The proposed measure shows how dependent this initiative is upon the availability of resources and upon when those resources are made available to the Navy. Delay can be damaging.
The second priority is “reliable naval facilities.” The Navy proposes two initiatives to pursue this priority. A high customer satisfaction on the use of naval facilities, as the first initiative, would have as its measure of success the increase in the average “customer satisfaction rating,” presumably on the part of PN personnel. The targets are: 75 percent for 2011, 80 percent for 2012, 85 percent for 2013, and finally 95 percent for 2020. The second initiative calls for a comprehensive PN real estate utilization program. The measure of success of this initiative is the average MDP completion rate of PN bases and stations. Starting from a low base in 2010, the Navy has set the following targets: 50 percent for 2011, 60 percent for 2012, 70 percent for 2013, and 100 percent for 2020.
Under the third priority of securing “up-to-date naval capability,” two initiatives have been put forward. The first is to establish a responsive self-reliance defense posture program, with the measure of success being the rating of equipment of OPREVAL. The targets start at 75 percent for 2011, 80 percent for 2012, and 85 percent for 2013. They end at 100 percent for 2020. The second initiative is full utilization of PN Defense Capability Assessment and Planning System. The measure of success is the percentage of capability proposal complied with (i.e. actual versus programmed), and this is targeted at 25 percent in 2011 (from the base of 20 percent in 2010). The target moves up to 40 percent in 2012, 60 percent in 2013, and finally 90 percent in 2020.
The fourth and final priority under the capability perspective is “optimal level of operational readiness.” Only one initiative is proposed, and it is to improve operational readiness program management. The critical measure of success of this initiative is the OPREVAL rating with the following targets: 60 percent in 2011, 65 percent in 2012, 70 percent in 2013, and 85 percent in 2020. The Navy is starting at a low base with respect to this measure, and the targets it has set for this measure indicate how difficult it is for the PN to push it up; even by 2020, it can put forward a target of only 85 percent.
One quick look at the performance scorecards the Navy has proposed under the capability perspective would impress upon anyone how critically important the indicated initiatives, measures, and targets are for success of the Navy Sail Plan. It is true that all performance scorecards have to be given due attention along with the necessary commitment, dogged perseverance, and resources. But it is the attention to the performance scorecards under the capability perspective which would ultimately determine whether the PN has succeeded with its Navy Sail Plan.
BCDA extends deadline for Bonifacio South
By Ben Arnold O. De Vera
The Manila Times, Tuesday, 21 September 2010
State-run Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) said it gave prospective bidders for the Fort Bonifacio property it is privatizing another month to prepare their elibility documents.
In a text message on Monday, Aileen Zosa, BCDA executive vice president and spokesperson, said that bidders for the 33.1-hectare Bonifacio South property can submit their eligibility documents until October 20.
The official said the agency granted the extension because bidders had asked for an extension.
Real estate giants Ayala Land Inc., Filinvest Land Inc., Jones Lang LaSalle Leechiu, Megaworld Corp.,Robinsons Land Corp. and Rockwell Land Corp. have expressed interest to challenge SM Land Inc.’s bid to develop the Bonifacio South lot covering the Philippine Army’s Army Support Command (ASCOM) and Special Services Unit (SSU), as well as the Philippine Navy’s Bonifacio Naval Station (BNS) and Philippine Marine Corps. (PMC).
SM Land had submitted to BCDA an unsolicited proposal to develop Bonifacio South for a minimum investment commitment of P20 billion.
The company’s bid offers an upfront cash amounting P2 billion upon signing the joint venture (JV) contract and also secured annual revenues of P25.9 billion, for a present value of P36,900 per square meter, for 20 years.
SM Land’s proposal will be subjected to a Swiss challenge, under Annex C of the National Economic and Development Authority’s JV Guidelines.
Under the Bonifacio South master plan, the BNS/PMC/ASCOM/SSU lots would be developed into a medium- to high-density residential and mixed-use complex, with a maximum allowable gross floor area of 1.355 million square meters.
The Manila Times, Tuesday, 21 September 2010
State-run Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) said it gave prospective bidders for the Fort Bonifacio property it is privatizing another month to prepare their elibility documents.
In a text message on Monday, Aileen Zosa, BCDA executive vice president and spokesperson, said that bidders for the 33.1-hectare Bonifacio South property can submit their eligibility documents until October 20.
The official said the agency granted the extension because bidders had asked for an extension.
Real estate giants Ayala Land Inc., Filinvest Land Inc., Jones Lang LaSalle Leechiu, Megaworld Corp.,Robinsons Land Corp. and Rockwell Land Corp. have expressed interest to challenge SM Land Inc.’s bid to develop the Bonifacio South lot covering the Philippine Army’s Army Support Command (ASCOM) and Special Services Unit (SSU), as well as the Philippine Navy’s Bonifacio Naval Station (BNS) and Philippine Marine Corps. (PMC).
SM Land had submitted to BCDA an unsolicited proposal to develop Bonifacio South for a minimum investment commitment of P20 billion.
The company’s bid offers an upfront cash amounting P2 billion upon signing the joint venture (JV) contract and also secured annual revenues of P25.9 billion, for a present value of P36,900 per square meter, for 20 years.
SM Land’s proposal will be subjected to a Swiss challenge, under Annex C of the National Economic and Development Authority’s JV Guidelines.
Under the Bonifacio South master plan, the BNS/PMC/ASCOM/SSU lots would be developed into a medium- to high-density residential and mixed-use complex, with a maximum allowable gross floor area of 1.355 million square meters.
Thursday, September 23, 2010
The Navy’s Resources
By DR. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO
Saturday, September 17, 2010
As a unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy (PN) operates on the basis of budgetary allocations that the national government provides and releases to it. This amount has always been subject to severe constraints: the Navy is always called upon to do so much on the basis of so little.
There is little the Navy can do about the budgetary allocations the General Appropriations Act provides for the AFP in general and for the PN in particular.
Thus, under the priority of “balanced financial programs,” one of two priorities listed under the resources perspective, the PN puts forward this initiative, to strengthen PN fiscal administration. The first measure of success under this initiative is keep at 100% the rate of obligation, i.e., ensure that the entire budgeted amount and released to the PN is duly and properly obligated and deployed. The other measure of success is to keep at zero Commission on Audit (COA) exceptions: the Navy plays by CoA rules and regulations, and intends to stay well within their ambit.
There is a limit, however, to what can be done under such stringent fiscal straits. Despite the inventiveness and creativity of PN personnel, inevitably budgetary tightness has long-term consequences. “Having to make do with so little” imposes severe constraints on the modernization of the fleet and the needed capital and other requirements of a modern Navy serving such a huge maritime area that the Philippines is blessed with. The President himself in his first State-of-the-Nation Address in July, 2010, specifically referred to the “MacArthur vintage” of some of our Navy ships, which miraculously are being made to run and operate in large part due to the maintenance expertise of PN personnel.
It is against this background that the second priority under this perspective should be understood. That priority is to secure “adequate financial resources” for the Navy Sail Plan. This priority is in line with the AFP modernization program, which calls for a sustainable non-traditional resource generating system for the PN. This means looking for other sources of funds that the Navy can use for its fleet modernization as well as its capital and other requirements. The President mentioned the Navy as a specific case under his proposed public-private partnership. Under such a partnership, with Navy land and other assets properly and judiciously deployed, the PN should start building a trust fund in 2011.
The initial amount targeted for 2011 is small: Only half a billion pesos. This amount should rise each year by half a billion pesos until 2013. The target for 2020 is modest at only five billion pesos: It is from the earnings of this fund that the Navy should be able to find the much needed supplement to the budgetary allocation it gets through the annual General Appropriations Act.
In fact, more broadly, through public-private partnership, the PN can have access to extra-budgetary resources that can be made available for its programs. The key lies in properly packaging the programs that can be funded under PPP arrangements; this would entail due observance of all relevant laws and proper practices of transparent, accountable governance that the President has called for.
The PN has already taken various steps in the direction of building a multi-sector governance coalition that would assist it in raising the standards of governance that it practices. It is also beginning to find out that with the commitment of such a coalition whose membership is drawn from various sectors of the Philippine community, it has many doors leading to additional financial resources it can tap for the critical priorities it included in its Sail Plan.
Saturday, September 17, 2010
As a unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy (PN) operates on the basis of budgetary allocations that the national government provides and releases to it. This amount has always been subject to severe constraints: the Navy is always called upon to do so much on the basis of so little.
There is little the Navy can do about the budgetary allocations the General Appropriations Act provides for the AFP in general and for the PN in particular.
Thus, under the priority of “balanced financial programs,” one of two priorities listed under the resources perspective, the PN puts forward this initiative, to strengthen PN fiscal administration. The first measure of success under this initiative is keep at 100% the rate of obligation, i.e., ensure that the entire budgeted amount and released to the PN is duly and properly obligated and deployed. The other measure of success is to keep at zero Commission on Audit (COA) exceptions: the Navy plays by CoA rules and regulations, and intends to stay well within their ambit.
There is a limit, however, to what can be done under such stringent fiscal straits. Despite the inventiveness and creativity of PN personnel, inevitably budgetary tightness has long-term consequences. “Having to make do with so little” imposes severe constraints on the modernization of the fleet and the needed capital and other requirements of a modern Navy serving such a huge maritime area that the Philippines is blessed with. The President himself in his first State-of-the-Nation Address in July, 2010, specifically referred to the “MacArthur vintage” of some of our Navy ships, which miraculously are being made to run and operate in large part due to the maintenance expertise of PN personnel.
It is against this background that the second priority under this perspective should be understood. That priority is to secure “adequate financial resources” for the Navy Sail Plan. This priority is in line with the AFP modernization program, which calls for a sustainable non-traditional resource generating system for the PN. This means looking for other sources of funds that the Navy can use for its fleet modernization as well as its capital and other requirements. The President mentioned the Navy as a specific case under his proposed public-private partnership. Under such a partnership, with Navy land and other assets properly and judiciously deployed, the PN should start building a trust fund in 2011.
The initial amount targeted for 2011 is small: Only half a billion pesos. This amount should rise each year by half a billion pesos until 2013. The target for 2020 is modest at only five billion pesos: It is from the earnings of this fund that the Navy should be able to find the much needed supplement to the budgetary allocation it gets through the annual General Appropriations Act.
In fact, more broadly, through public-private partnership, the PN can have access to extra-budgetary resources that can be made available for its programs. The key lies in properly packaging the programs that can be funded under PPP arrangements; this would entail due observance of all relevant laws and proper practices of transparent, accountable governance that the President has called for.
The PN has already taken various steps in the direction of building a multi-sector governance coalition that would assist it in raising the standards of governance that it practices. It is also beginning to find out that with the commitment of such a coalition whose membership is drawn from various sectors of the Philippine community, it has many doors leading to additional financial resources it can tap for the critical priorities it included in its Sail Plan.
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